"This paper provides an historical perspective on the crisis of 2007-2008. The crisis is part of a perennial pattern. It has echoes in earlier big international financial crises which were triggered by events in the U.S. financial system. Examples include the crises of 1857, 1893 1907 and 1929-33. This crisis has many similarities to those of the past but also some important modern twists."

"...after Citibank made some bets that turned out badly in the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, its CEO John Reed helped mid-wife the Economics Program at the Santa Fe Institute. He wanted the new theoretical insights about financial crises that the new complexity scientists promised. Ever since, the complexity scientists have been telling us that markets are self-organizing systems. For the life of me, I can't see how this puts us way ahead. Didn't seem to help Citibank either, which I've noticed is back in the headlines.
(...)
I agree with the closing suggestion, that air transport is a good place to look for lessons about avoiding crashes. No matter what we do, we will still have financial crises, just as we still have plane crashes. But judging from our success in making air travel safer, it seems reasonable to bet on an institutionalized commitment to systematic data collection as a way to reduce their frequency and severity. As a traveler and an investor, I feel much safer in the hands of experts with good data than tourists from other scientific disciplines bearing new models.

O Departamento de Economia tem o prazer de informar que a CAPES aprovou o Mestrado em Economia do Departamento de Economia da UFPel. O Mestrado na área de Mercados e Organizações possui parceria com o Departamento de Ciências Sociais Agrárias e duas linhas de pesquisa: mercado & organizações e cadeias agroindustriais.

O Mestrado terá início em 2009 e o processo de seleção será amplamente divulgado na imprensa e no site.

Parabéns a todos!!

André Carraro

Brazil, Mexico and a few other Latin American republics enjoyed faster industrialization after 1870 than did the rest of Latin America and even faster than the rest of the poor periphery (except East Asia). How much of this economic performance was due to more accommodating institutions and greater political stability, changes that would have facilitated greater technology transfer and accumulation? That is, how much to changing fundamentals? How much instead to a cessation in the secular rise in the net barter terms of trade which reversed de-industrialization forces, thus favoring manufacturing? How much instead to cheaper foodstuffs coming from more open commercial policies ('grain invasions'), and from railroad-induced integration of domestic grain markets, serving to keep urban grain prices and thus nominal wages in industry low, helping to maintain competitiveness? How much instead to more pro-industrial real exchange rate and tariff policy? Which of these forces contributed most to industrialization among the Latin American leaders, long before their mid 20th century adoption of ISI policies? Changing fundamentals, changing market conditions, or changing policies?