Como a dívida pública acelerou a Revolução Industrial Inglesa?

Ventura e Voth explicam:

By the 1750s, the first nobles were switching massively out of land and into government debt. ...The shift from investing in liming, marling, draining, and enclosure into government debt liberated resources – labour that could no longer be profitably employed in the countryside had to look for employment elsewhere. Because so much of English agricultural labour was provided by wage labourers, the switch to government debt pushed workers off the land. Unsurprisingly, wages failed to keep pace with output; real wages, adjusted for urban disamenities, probably fell over the period 1750-1830. What made life miserable for the workers, as eloquently described by Engels amongst others, was a boon to the capitalists. Their profit rates continued to rise as capital received an ever-larger share of the pie – while the share of national income going to labour and land contracted. Higher profits spelled more investment in new industries, and Britain’s industrial growth accelerated.

Bom, se eles estão certos, surge um problema para o caso brasileiro. Afinal, no século XIX, o Império brasileiro era um ótimo tomador de empréstimo e com boa reputação. Porque, afinal, o mesmo mecanismo não aconteceu aqui?

(Não tem relação direta com o assunto, mas eu adoro citar outro texto co-autorado pelo Voth: "Lending frowm the borrower from hell: debt and default in the age of Philip II". O Rei Felipe deu calote quatro vezes e os banqueiros genoveses continuavam emprestando. O texto explica a lógica)