Esse paper apresenta um mecanismo possível (o velho: "Viu? Eu te disse!"):
"Machieavellian Experimentation" por Xie e Xie
This paper proposes a mechanism in which, instead of intensifying disagreement, polarization of beliefs could eliminate political gridlock: Significant political payoffs from being proven correct by policy experimentation could drive decision makers who disbelieve in the new policy to agree to policy experimentation, since they are confident that the experimentation would fail and increase their political power. We formalize this mechanism in a collective decision making model in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs in which any decision other than the default option requires unanimity. We show that this consideration of political payoffs can eliminate the inefficiency caused by unanimity when beliefs are extremely different, but could also create under-experimentation when beliefs are slightly different. We illustrate the empirical relevance of the mechanism in two examples with historical narratives: the decision making process of the Chinese leadership during the country’s transition starting in the late 1970s and the disagreement within the leadership of the Allied Forces on the Western Front of World War II in the autumn of 1944.