"The idea that large historical events are determined by luck is profoundly shocking, although it is demonstrably true."Como ele escreve, houve um momento em que havia 50% de chances dos pais do Hitler gerarem uma menina e o século XX teria sido bem diferente.
"What purports to be the “new” part is the assertion that coordination and upgrading of infrastructure should in some way be related to particular industries. It is at this point where a question arises: most economists would accept the view that cost–benefit analysis should be used in the choice of infrastructure projects. If “externalities” and “coordination” are important, are they important for specific industries or for the entire industrial economy? If the former, how are those industries to be identified, and how would the externalties be estimated in cost–benefit analysis? Or would they? If infrastructure is seen to be industry-specific, it is not clear what it is. As with the possible existence of infant industries, it is one thing to believe that there are such industries (perhaps) and quite another to identify ahead of time which they are. And even if such industries exist and are identified, questions arise as to the incentives that would be appropriate for the government to foster these industries. (Would they be firm-specific treatment? Tariffs? Subsidies to firms or industries? Each has huge problems.) And if it is more “conventional,” what is new? If infrastructure is specific to industry (or a group of industries), the same questions must be addressed. (...)
“Picking winners” as industries is difficult; it cannot be firm specific or the usual problems of corruption and cronyism arise. And yet supporting an industry or industries as an undifferentiated entity is difficult: are textiles an industry? Or is synthetic fiber an industry? Or is nylon an industry?"Vale a pena ler o texto inteiro.
"...collective choice is inherently biased toward favoring a city’s or neighborhood’s current residents, against potential future residents. This makes policies created through collective choice inherently anti-density and anti-growth. It also means that cities come with a built-in vested interest that wants to protect their property. When planning departments allow this group to protect their interest through the political process, the market process is stifled because entrepreneurs cannot take advantage of available profit opportunities to increase urban density.Furthermore, collective choice leads to many unholy alliances, such as NIMBYs and historic preservationists, NIMBYs and environmentalists who want to protect open space, NIMBYs and those opposed to new transit projects, etc. In other words, collective choice leads to many of the results that urbanists criticize."A primeira parte da série está aqui.
"No Brasil, a expansão educacional (...) atingiu taxas brutas de matrícula no primário de 98% apenas na década de 1990, enquanto países como Argentina(...) registravam 97% de crianças matriculadas na década de 1950 (Frankema, 2008, p. 215). Além disso, se observarmos as taxas de alfabetização, veremos que em 1950 o Brasil apresentava taxa de 49,3%, enquanto Argentina e Estados Unidos estavam muito à frente (88% e 97% respectivamente). Mesmo em 2000, o Brasil ainda não havia alcançado a taxa argentina de 1950, uma vez que apenas 85% da população era alfabetizada: situação pior que a da Bolívia (86%) (Bergès, 2009, p. 28)."A explicação para o péssimo desempenho brazuca: o Governo Federal passou a responsabilidade da educação primária para os estados e municípios, os quais não tinham capacidade fiscal para arcar com os custos. Além disso, a baixa participação eleitoral, mesmo no sub-período democrático, desincentivou os investimentos em educação. Uma outra bomba que deveria corar os viúvos do Vargas: não só o Gustavo Capanema nem estava aí para a educação primária, como o desempenho educacional foi bem ruinzinho no período. O Thomas, a propósito, é da novíssima geração de historiadores econômicos quantitativos, blogueiro e foi orientado pelo Colistete.
"Critics of free market urban development may argue that this system (:free market) will produce less-than-perfect cities, so city planners should step in to make improvements. The Austrian response is that of course the free market cannot produce utopian cities, but no other system could do better. Believing that a regulated city would be superior to the market outcome is succumbing to the Nirvana fallacy. Markets aren’t perfect, but they’re the best we’ve got."Não dá para levar as conclusões dos austríacos até o fim, mas muitos pontos são relevantes. A propósito, o livro magistral da Jane "austríaca-sem-saber" Jacobs "The Death and Life of Great American Ciites" completou 50 anos em 2011.
Location:Av. Eng. Roberto Freire,Natal,Brazil
A industrialização dos anos 30, por exemplo, só foi possível depois de uma década de crise, dos anos 1920, na qual, a partir da disseminação dos rádios, dando expressão a uma cultura popular e erudita que devolveram a autoestima nacional.A crise dos 80 foi causada.... deixa ver.... pela derrota da seleção canarinho em 82? Ou será que foi a gravação de "Inútil" pelo Ultraje que baixou a nossa moral? Ah, se tivéssemos ouvido chorinho...
